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See Dick and Jane
Get Creative:

TIGRs

An Introduction to Some
Innovative Financial Instruments
By Susan C. Borkowski

LYONs
CATs, LYONs, TIGRs, CMOs, STRIPs, CIBs, ABCs —
Today’s accountants aren’t sure whether they have gone
to the zoo or ordered a bowl of alphabet soup when it
comes to understanding the more innovative and exotic
financial instruments available today. The continuing
evolution and creation of such financial instruments is due
to the needs of companies to 1) raise capital while improv
ing their financial statements, 2) improve their financial
statements only, and/or 3) raise capital at a lower cost
than that provided by more traditional financial tools
[Pantalone and Welch, 1987].
What follows is a primer for accounting practitioners
and those in academia whose daily activities do not
ordinarily include the rapidly changing, expanding, and
sometimes arcane world of financial instruments. A brief
description of the more innovative, advanced or exotic
types of financing tools is included to provide an introduc
tion to the variations on mortgages, securities and interest
rate tactics available to sophisticated financial managers
and investors. The items discussed are not all-inclusive,
but were chosen as a representative sampling of the
contemporary creative developments in the financial
arena.
The new financial instruments have caused some
problems regarding accounting and reporting treatment:
Are they debt, quasi-equity, or some hybrid? Many of the
issues before the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) are
concerned with the accounting and reporting recognition,
measurement and disclosure aspects of such instruments.
The remaining sections of this paper provide a brief
introduction to the EITF, and a discussion of the more
advanced or exotic financial instruments currently
available to the adventurous company and investor.

Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
created the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) in 1984
to provide timely guidance on new issues not addressed
by existing accounting standards and pronouncements.
The EITF identifies these issues and reaches a consensus
on how each issue should be handled, advising the FASB
on any possible actions necessary. In this way, the num
ber of FASB statements and technical bulletins are kept to
a minimum, and practitioners have the EITF’s guidance in
a timely manner.
The EITF meets every six weeks to study specific
issues of concern to practitioners, and, more rarely, to the
SEC and other outside agencies. A consensus providing
detailed accounting guidance on a specific issue is
released when at least thirteen of the fifteen voting
members agree on an accounting approach. At the end of
1988, the EITF had either resolved or were currently
addressing 190 issues, of which 61 were concerned with
new financial instruments and off-balance-sheet financing.
In addition to the EITF providing more immediate
guidance in these two areas, the FASB began a long-term
project on “Financial Instruments and Off-Balance-Sheet
Financing” in May 1986. The scope is so large and the
subject matter so detailed that it is expected to take at
least four years to adequately address the aspects of
financial instrument disclosures, recognition criteria,
measurement issues, and hybrid debt-equity instruments.
An Exposure Draft, “Disclosures about Financial Instru
ments” was issued in March 1988.
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Financial Instruments
The more conventional financial in
struments include but are not limited
to debt with either fixed or floating
interest, debt with detachable stock
warrants, and convertible debt. Most
practitioners and academics are
familiar with these time-tested debt
instruments, with much literature
devoted to their accounting treat
ment, measurement, and disclosure.
Some of the more advanced
instruments may be familiar from the
pages of the Wall Street Journal,
Barron’s, and other publications.
Others may be quite new. What
follows is a short introduction to the
perhaps less familiar of the financial
instruments available in today’s
financial markets.

CMOs
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
(CMOs) and CMO Residuals
CMOs were first introduced in
June 1983 by the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC).
CMOs are debt securities, such as
cash-flow or pay-through bonds,
backed by a pool of mortgages or
mortgage-backed securities issued
by the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA - Fannie Maes),
the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA - Ginnie Maes),
and the Federal Home Loan Mort
gage Corporation (FHLMC - Freddie
Macs). There are also private
issuers, such as various financial
institutions and construction firms.
Each CMO can be divided into
classes of bonds, called tranches,
each with a different average life and
maturity. If a CMO has four tranches
(A, B, C and Z), maturity and payoff
would be sequential, with the class A
bonds having the shortest term and
providing the quickest return of
principal. Tranches B and C would
be considered medium- and long
term, respectively. Interest payments
would be made on a current
(monthly, quarterly, or semi-annu
ally) basis to class A, B and C
bondholders, while interest would
accrue to class Z bondholders.
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Principal would be paid first to class
A bondholders; when these are fully
paid, principal would then be paid to
class B, and finally class C bondhold
ers. Only when tranches A, B, and C
have been fully paid as to interest
and principal will class Z bondhold
ers receive payments for principal
and accrued interest, usually at
maturity. Tranche Z generally
appeals only to tax-exempt investors,
since tax must be paid on interest as
it is earned, not when paid.
CMOs are usually AAA rated, and
so are very safe with a minimal risk
of default on interest and principal
payments; they also offer some call
protection against prepayments.
CMOs are considered debt obliga
tions of the issuer for tax purposes
because of the Sears Trust rule. One
aspect of this rule stipulates that the
CMOs are not equity in the mort
gages which act as their collateral. It
is the collateral which gives rise to
the cash flow to the bondholders.
Taxation is “unclear due to the
uncertainty of mortgage prepay
ments that affect yield on CMOs.
The issuer’s interest deduction
depends on the CMOs uncertain
yield.” [Carl and Jurer, 1987] CMOs
must be treated as corporate debt,
and not the sale of assets, in order to
avoid double taxation, where the
interest paid to the bondholders is
deducted for tax purposes by the
issuer. In effect the Sears Trust rule
imposes artificial tax constraints and
over-collateralization, which are
reinforced in FASB Technical
Bulletin 85-2. GAAP requires that the
CMO be treated as a liability of the
issuer if it satisfies the tax law
criteria for debt. The CMO cannot be
treated as a trust because it has
multiple classes, so many issuers are
opting for Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduit (REMIC) status
(REMICs are discussed in a later
section). Eventually, most CMOs will
be replaced by REMICs in 1992.
After the tranches or classes of
bondholders have been satisfied as
to principal and interest, the residual
interests share in the cash remaining
in the mortgage pool. The CMO
residuals are usually unrated as they
are riskier than CMOs themselves.
The increased risk arises because
“the return on a residual interest is
more dependent on prepayments on
the underlying mortgages” [Kelley,

1988]. Prepayments will increase in
an environment of dropping interest
rates, causing less interest to be paid
on the remaining balance, leading to
a decrease in any residuals.
Stripped Mortgage Backed
Securities (SMBS): Interest-Only
(IOs) and Principal-Only (POs)
Certificates
Partially stripped securities were
introduced in July 1986 by FNMA
(Fannie Mae), with fully stripped 10/
PO SMBS available in February
1987. the cash flow is “stripped” from
the mortgages into principal and
interest components. Each cash flow
can then be sold separately to
different investors.
The IOs get all the “interest
payments,” but no principal, and are
uncertain as to both the amount and
the timing of cash receipts. The POs
get all the principal payments, but
none of the interest. POs are uncer
tain only about the timing of the cash
receipts, since the principal amount
is certain.
In an environment where the
interest rates are dropping, POs will
get an increased yield because more
prepayments will occur. In the same
environment, IOs will experience a
lowered yield because these in
creased prepayments will lower the
principal balance upon which the
interest is computed [Kelly, 1988].

Synthetic (Derivative) Securities
A synthetic mortgage security is a
hybrid formed by “combining the
cashflows of a derivative mortgage
security (a strip) with the cashflows
of a standard mortgage passthrough” [Darivoff, 1987]. Such
financial instruments are helpful in
lessening the impact of volatile
interest rates and unanticipated
prepayments on expected yields.
Investors mix IOs and POs to
manage portfolios in an environment
of changing interest rates to obtain a
certain yield without having to trade
securities already in the portfolio. If
interest rates rise, IOs will be added
to the existing portfolio. Conversely,
POs will be added if interest rates
drop.
Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduit (REMIC)
Introduced in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA ‘86), the REMIC is not

a security, but a vehicle or “structure
that determines how an issue of
multiclass mortgage-backed securi
ties will be taxed” [Altarescu and
Pearl, 1986] while avoiding two levels
of tax. REMICs should be the
dominant vehicle for the issuance of
multiple interest class mortgage
securities beginning in 1992. If the
securities meet the REMIC criteria,
they can be treated as mortgage
investments and not corporate debt,
which is one of the drawbacks of
CMOs. GAAP depends on the legal
form of the REMIC security; it can be
treated as debt (bonds) or as a sale
(pass-through).
REMIC status can be chosen for
any entity (partnership, trust,
corporation) whose securities satisfy
the following:
1. at least one security must have a
class of “Regular Interest” hold
ers, such as an interest in the pool
of mortgages,
2. there must be one, and only one,
class of “Residual Interest”
owners, which is an interest not
designated for regular interest
holders, and
3. REMIC status is chosen in the
first taxable year, or is in effect for
all prior taxable years.
The tax rules for REMICs are clear,
allow for uniform tax treatment, and
are favorable to the investor. A
REMIC can be “structured as a(n
asset) sale, rather than a debt (so) it
can be used as a qualifying real
estate investment for savings institu
tion tax purposes. CMO cannot”
[Linnen, 1986]. Also, “TRA ‘86
provides that REMICs are not
separate taxable entities, and are not
subject to taxation. Instead, income
is allocated to the holders of the
REMIC interests under special rules
in IRC 860A-860G [Kramer, 1988].
Regular interests are taxed like debt
securities, with income recognized
under the accrual method. Residual
interests are treated as ordinary
income or loss. IRC 860 C(c) (1)
provides that REMIC distributions
are tax-free, as long as they are less
than the owner’s adjusted basis in
the residual interest. REMICs allow a
choice of accounting treatment,
depending on their structure either
as a sale of an asset (via a grantor
trust) with off-book accounting
treatment, or as a debt instrument
(via a CMO) with a liability on the

books and no income associated with
the sale.

Interest Rate Swaps
Interest rate swaps began in the
early 1980s, and involve contractual
agreements for the “exchange
between two or more entities of the
interest payment streams” of two
instruments, but does not involve the
swapping of principal [Rue, Tosh and
Francis, 1988]. The swap of a fixed
rate of interest for a variable rate is
called the plain vanilla swap, and
gained in popularity in 1981. A
variable for variable rate swap, called
a basis swap, soon followed. A basis
swap uses variable rates based on
different indices, such as swapping
an interest payment streat based on
the prime rate for one based on a
foreign index, such as the London

Interbank Offeror Rate (LIBOR).
The third type of swap is the circus,
or cross-currency, interest rate,
swap. The circus swap combines an
interest rate swap and a currency
swap for principal, reaping the
reduced interest expense afforded by
the former while raising capital and
increasing earnings per share
through the currency swap.
The advantages of interest rate
swaps include control over the
interest rate risk by matching
interest costs and revenues, active
management of risk rates by letting
companies “obtain lower financing
costs through effectively changing
the nature of their existing debt” and
comparative advantage, to allow the
exploitation of different characteris
tics of different markets [Rue, et al].
Swaps are also inexpensive to
arrange, and provide flexibility in
financing. The credit risk is small,
limited only to the difference in the
interest rates if there was a default,
since there is no swap of principal in
plain and basis swaps.
For accounting purposes, FAS 80
dictates that a “firm would recognize

a change in the market value of an
open futures contract as a gain or
loss in the period of the change
unless: the contract qualifies as a
hedge of a present exposure, or the
contract relates to a qualifying
anticipated transaction” [Rue, et al].
Forward Swaps
A forward swap is an interest rate
swap that begins on a future date,
enabling a company to lock in
favorable rates.

Swaptions
Swaptions, introduced in 1984 by
Kleinwort Benson (United King
dom), are options on interest rate
swaps, or interest rate options. These
allow a company to “lock into their
borrowing cost for a period by
buying an option to fix the interest
rate on a borrowing linked to six
month LIBOR ... but still have the
advantage of cheaper funding if
interest rates fall” [Cooper and
Shegog, 1987]. The disadvantages
are the costs involved in buying an
option, and the need for a sophisti
cated tracking system to realize the
benefits of a swaption.

Forward Currency Contracts
Forward currency contracts, also
known as forward exchange transac
tions, are “agreements to purchase/
sell fixed amounts of one foreign
currency in exchange for another
foreign currency” [Brooks and
Bhave, 1981]. These are individually
tailored agreements between two
parties, without any specific settle
ment dates, quantities, etc., allowing
greater flexibility for the participat
ing parties.
Zero Coupon Bonds
Zero coupon bonds separate into
interest coupons and principal for
sale to separate investors. The
principal is stripped from a regular
bond (corporate, municipal or
treasury) and sold without interest at
a deep discount. Zero coupon bonds
can be proprietary or governmentbacked, as the following list of past
and present bonds indicates:
1. TIGRs (Treasury Investment
Growth Receipts): Merrill Lynch,
1982.
2. CATS (Certificates of Accrual on
Treasury Securities (): Salomon
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Brothers, 1982.
3. LYONs (Liquid Yield Option
Notes): Lehman Brothers (no
longer on market).
4. STRIPS (Separate Trading of
Registered Interest and Principal
Securities): Department of the
Treasury, 1985.
5. CIBs (Tax-exempt Compound
Interest Bonds): Municipalities.
6. ABCS (Agency Backed Compound
Securities): Kidder, Peabody (are
secured by GNMA, FNMA and
FHLMC securities).
The benefits of zero coupon bonds
are ease of sale in the market with
reinvestment if interest rates are
volatile, a “locked-in rate of return ...
no reinvesting of coupon payments,
no callability factor (for STRIPS),
(and) no quality questions: [Crim,
1987]. Disadvantages include early
call provisions for some non-Treas
ury bonds, high broker fees, and the
taxing of interest in the year earned,
rather than when paid at the maturity
of the coupon package. The advan
tage of a locked-in rate of return can
be a disadvantage if the market
environment changes. The tax
aspects make zero coupon bonds
attractive for financing IRAs, Keoghs,
college funds, institutional fixedincome funding, or for low income
tax bracket investors.
Most zero coupon bonds are sold
in $1,000 units. For smaller investors,
the emergence of zero coupon
mutual funds allow investments as
small as $100.

Adjustable Rate Preferred Stock
(ARBs)
Introduced in May 1982 by Chase
Bank and Chemical Bank, adjustable
rate preferred stock is primary
equity capital with the benefits of a
debt security, including the tax
advantages to investors. The benefits
of issuing ARPs include the improve
ment of the capital ratio without the
dilution of common stock; a senior
claim on earnings, making dividends
more reliable; and, qualification of
80% of the dividends for the divi
dends-received deduction for tax
purposes to avoid double taxation.
The main disadvantage is the
existence of both a floor and ceiling
on the rate at which dividends are
paid.
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Auction Rate Preferred Stock
Introduced in 1984 by Shearson
Lehman (American Express),
auction rate preferred stock is
collateralized preferred stock, also

known as money market preferred
(MMP), and is a variation on ARPs
(see prior section). The name is
derived from the process by which
the “dividend is periodically adjusted
by reference to a so-called “Dutch
Auction’ in which holders (and
potential holders) of instruments bid
to buy or sell the instruments among
themselves” [Silversmith, 1987].
Auction rate preferred stock
overcomes the disadvantage of ARPs
in that there is no limit on the rate on
which dividends are figured. Benefits
include the protection of principal
and the floating dividend which is
reset every 49 days to match current
market rates. This 49 day cycle is an
approximation of the 46 day holding
period required for tax deduction
eligibility. Some disadvantages
include the 49 day auction process,
causing 49 day liquidity intervals and
constant participation and monitor
ing, a high initial investment per
share, and the uncertainty of the
secondary market, which may
become thin in reaction to changing
market rates.
Some questions remain as to the
nature of auction rate preferreds: are
they primary capital (general consen
sus is yes), and are they qualified for
tax reduction? Since the risk is so
small, is it really risk for the pur
poses of qualifying for the 80%
dividend-received deduction?
Similar to zero coupon bonds,
auction rate preferreds are being
incorporated into mutual funds for
ease of management, instant liquid
ity, and smaller initial investment.

Securitization of Assets (Other Than
Mortgages)
The securitization of assets
involves the sale to outside investors
of high quality financial assets such
as credit card receivables, automo
bile loans, and lease payments in a
loan portfolio. These assets become
liquid securities paying principal and
interest to the investors as the loans
and receivables are repaid. A group
of loans and/or receivables are put
into a grantor trust, which then
issues certificates which can be
purchased by investors. In 1985,
collateralized lease equipment
obligations (CLEOs) were intro
duced by Sperry Leasing Corpora
tion and certificates of automobile re
ceivables (CARs) by General Motors
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
and various banks. In 1986, certifi
cates of amortizing revolving debt
(CARDs) were issued by Salomon
Brothers through Bank One, and
Marine Midland Bank.
The benefits of asset securitization
include “lower financing costs,
particularly for issuers with high
quality receivables; eliminating
ongoing funding uncertainty of
owning receivables by directly
funding these receivables; shrinking
the balance sheet through offbalance sheet accounting treatments,
if the security is structured as a sale;
and presenting new business oppor
tunities for companies that can
originate high quality receivables,
sell them in securities, and retain
upfront fee and ongoing servicing
income” [Johnson, 1986]. The
primary cost of securitization is that
most often only the higher quality
assets are securitized and removed
from the balance sheet. The com
pany or bank is then left with lesser
quality, riskier assets on their
financial statements.
Asset securitization can be carried
out as either a sale structure or a
debt structure. The sale structure
“results is an asset-backed passthrough certificate issued by a
grantor trust. Assets are sold out
right, and the seller has no obligation
regarding repayment” [Hull and
Annand, 1987]. Certificates of
automobile receivables (CARs) are
structured as sales. The debt struc
ture, as represented by certificates of
amortizing revolving debt (CARDs),
“involves notes that are collateralized

debt obligations of the issuing bank.
The bank treats the debt transaction
as secured financing ... requir(ing)
creation of a finance subsidiary of
the bank. The subsidiary purchases
a pool of assets from its patent bank
and issues fixed notes secured by the
assets”.

Perpetual Debt
In 1984, Citicorp was the first
United States bank to issue perpetual
debt in the Eurobond market.
Perpetual floating rate notes (FRNs)
are “notes with a floating rate reset at
certain periods but without any final
maturity date” [Campbell, 1987].
There has been confusion as to the
nature of perpetual debt; FRNs are
quasi-equity, and are treated by the
issuers as primary capital. Investors
in FRNs, however, must consider
them to be subordinated debt,
because “holders effectively have an
equity instrument which pays them
after all creditors, and even deposi
tors, in the event of bankruptcy.”
The main problem experienced by
perpetual debt instrument issuers
and holders is that, as margins
narrow, investors are not getting paid
enough to compensate for the
subordinated debt/quasi-equity risk,
so market liquidity disappears. The
FRNs are then very difficult to trade.

Defeasance of Debt
Prior to 1982, when Exxon was the
first corporation to successfully carry
out an in-substance defeasance of
debt, only state and local govern
ments were doing so. Defeasance
involves removing the debt from the
company books while investing in
risk-free government securities.
These securities and/or cash are
then placed in an irrevocable trust
from which the interest and eventu
ally the principal of the original debt
will be paid. SFAS #76 provides the
criteria for the extinguishment of
debt with a specified maturity and
fixed payment schedule and its
removal from the financial reports.
This defeasance gives rise to a taxdeferred gain for accounting pur
poses, but has no tax effects because
the debt has not been actually
retired.
Companies choose to defease debt
for better debt management during a
period when interest rates are

changing such that the rates are
higher than the original debt’s
coupon yield; as a defensive mecha
nism to use up cash which might
invite takeover attempts; and, to
improve the balance sheet and
financial ratios. The interest on the
defeased debt is deductible for tax
purposes but has no effect on the
financial statements, and therefore
no effect on reported profits. Defea
sance leads to an immediate improve
ment of reported earnings, lower
taxes, lower interest expense, lower
debt/equity ratios, higher earnings
per share and higher return on
assets.
Certain types of debt cannot be
defeased, including debt with floating
interest rates, debt payable upon
demand, convertible debentures,
convertible debt, leveraged lease
financing, and newly issued debt
[McDonald and Sutton, 1984]. The
latter is an attempt at instant defea
sance, where a company borrows
and defeases instantaneously, usually
borrowing in the European market at
lower rates, defeasing the debt and
investing in United States govern
ment securities at a higher rate. This
gives rise to an immediate gain, and
is prohibited by SFAS #76, which
applies only to existing, and not
newly issued, debt.
Questions have arisen about the
propriety of defeasing other financial
instruments, such as redeemable
preferred stock, which is currently
an equity transaction and therefore
cannot be defeased; callable debt,
which can be defeased after all the
variable aspects are dealt with; and
capital leases, which can be defeased
if using a fixed payment schedule
and not contingent rentals.
Redeemable Equity
An early use of redeemable equity
was by Great Britain’s Hawley group
and Credit Suisse First Boston in
1986. Redeemable equity is preferred
stock with mandatory redemption
features; since it is equity, it there
fore improves the debt/equity ratio,
which convertible bonds do not. This
instrument is used to raise cash
quickly, but it is subject to a debt
versus equity debate. Currently, the
issuance of redeemable preferred
stock is treated as a capital transac
tion with no attendant gains or
losses.

Conclusion
The foregoing discussion of
financial instruments was not meant
to be all-inclusive or encyclopedic.
The purpose was to provide those
practitioners and academics in
accounting who do not ordinarily
deal with such items with a brief in
troduction to the rapidly changing,
expanding and sometimes confusing
world of financial instruments.
Susan C. Borkowski is an Assistant
Professor at LaSalle University.
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